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LEGAL DEFINITIONS OF CRUELTY AND ANIMAL 
RIGHTS 
Anita Dichter* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Legal definitions of cruelty to animals reflect the ethics of our 
society with respect to animal rights. In particular, such definitions 
reveal prevailing attitudes toward animal suffering. Omissions in 
the law which permit abusive treatment of animals without legal 
sanction indicate society's tacit acceptance of such abuse. Even 
when our society has recognized the need for animal protection stat-
utes, animal welfare is generally not the true concern of such stat-
utes. The underlying motivation for such legislation is too often a 
human interest in protecting property or preventing malicious be-
havior. The language of anti-cruelty statutes, construction of these 
laws in the courts, and specific statutory exemptions which result 
in a lack of legal standards for activities such as laboratory experi-
ments on animals all point to an inescapable conclusion: animals 
may enjoy certain kinds of protection, but they do not possess legal 
rights. Until the law recognizes more than the human interests in 
preventing cruelty to animals, animals will have no right to be free 
from pain and suffering at the hands of humans. 
In his essay, Should Trees Have Standing?, I Law Professor Chris-
topher D. Stone notes that there is no generally accepted standard 
for the term "legal rights." Consequently, Stone posits a set of basic 
criteria for possessing legal rights against which to measure the 
rights of natural objects. Applying Stone's criteria to animal law 
will help point out the distinction between mere protection, such as 
that provided by anti-cruelty legislation, and the possession of legal 
rights. 
• Winner, Animal Rights Essay Contest. 
I C. STONE, SHOULD TREES HAVE STANDING? (1974) (originally published in 45 S.CAL. L. REv. 
450 (1972». 
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According to Stone, a fundamental requirement of being a 
"holder of legal rights," is that some public authoritative body will 
review actions inconsistent with that right. 2 Animals may meet this 
minimal criterion toward holding legal rights since anti-cruelty stat-
utes define prohibited behavior against animals, and such behavior 
is subject to judicial review and punishment. However, as Stone 
points out, "for a thing to be a holder of legal rights, something more 
is needed than that some authoritative body will review the actions 
and processes of those who threaten it."3 He proposes three addi-
tional criteria, each of which must be satisfied: "All three, one will 
observe, go towards making a thing count jurally-to have a legally 
recognized worth and dignity in its own right, and not merely to 
serve as a means to benefit 'us' (whoever the contemporary group 
of rights-holders may be)."· The three additional criteria are: 
"[F]irst, that the thing can institute legal actions at its behest; 
second, that in determining the granting of legal relief, the court 
must take injury to it into account; and, third, that relief must run 
to the benefit of it."5 For purposes of this discussion, it may be 
useful to rephrase these criteria substituting the following legal ter-
minology. In order to be a holder of legal rights: (1) the animal must 
have standing to institute legal action; (2) substantive laws must be 
based on injury to the animal itself; and (3) the remedy or relief 
must benefit the animal. Each of these aspects will be analyzed in 
relation to current anti-cruelty legislation and judicial application 
of these laws. 
II. STANDING 
The possession of legal rights is meaningless unless one has stand-
ing to vindicate those rights in court. The fundamental importance 
of the relationship between standing and the possession of rights 
was demonstrated in the Supreme Court decision, Sierra Club v. 
Morton. 8 Sierra Club, an environmental group, sought to challenge 
proposed construction by Walt Disney Enterprises in Mineral King 
Valley, California, an area of great natural beauty. The plaintiff, 
however, was denied standing because there was no allegation that 
Sierra Club members made use of the area. The Court ruled that 
unless specific activities and interests of the plaintiff would be 
Z [d. at 11. 
, [d. 
• [d. 
, [d. 
o 405 U.S. 727 (1972). 
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adversely affected by the Disney development, the plaintiff could 
not maintain the suit. Clearly, an interest was being invaded, but 
it was not a demonstrable human interest. Mr. Justice Douglas 
dissented, and argued that the environmental issues should "be 
tendered by the inanimate object itself,"7 and that the action might 
be properly labeled "Mineral King v. Morton."8 If ships and corpo-
rations have legal personality, he continued, then "[s]o it should 
be as respects valleys, alpine meadows, rivers, lakes, estuaries, 
beaches, ridges, groves of trees, swampland, or even air that feels 
the destructive pressures of modern technology and modern 
life .... The river as plaintiff speaks for the ecological unit of life 
that is part of it. . . . "9 
In refusing to grant standing to the environmental group, the 
Sierra Club majority relied on the test for determining standing as 
set forth in Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, 
Inc. v. Camp. 10 This two-part test requires (1) a showing of actual 
injury;" and (2) an indication that the interest sought to be pro-
tected is "arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or 
regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee. . . . "12 Such 
interests, although traditionally economic, may also be aesthetic, 
conservational or recreationalY However, according to the Sierra 
Club majority, the interests invaded must be those of a human 
being, not the environment itself. 14 
Although at first glance animals appear to be the object of protec-
tion in anti-cruelty laws, in many instances animals (or their repre-
sentatives) are unable to seek relief in court. As subsequent discus-
sion will reveal, these laws actually protect human interests rather 
than the animal itself. This distinction is important in determining 
whether animals are within the zone of interests protected by the 
statutes and thus whether they have standing to bring an action in 
court. 
Under the common law, animals were without rights. 15 Cruelty to 
animals was dealt with as an invasion of the owner's property rights 
in the animal. Pain and suffering to the animal was not a considera-
7 [d. at 752. 
• [d. at 742. 
• [d. at 743. 
10 397 U.S. 150 (1970). 
11 [d. at 152. 
12 [d. at 153. 
\3 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972) . 
.. See Sierra Club v. Morton, id. at 734-35. 
,. See McCausland v. People, 58 Colo. 303, 305, 145 P. 685, 686 (1914). 
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tion, and furthermore, only the owner could seek a remedy for the 
animal's injury or destruction. In no sense can it be said that an 
action for such injury was instituted on the animal's behalf or for 
the protection of its rights. 
Anti-cruelty statutes have now superseded the common law and 
make certain behavior toward animals actionable in itself. No 
longer is it necessary for an animal's owner to show invasion of a 
property right in order for abusive treatment of an animal to be 
subject to judicial scrutiny. IS Query then whether animals are 
within the "zone of interests" to be protected by the anti-cruelty 
statutes, or in other words, whether they have standing under those 
statutes. 
The final disposition of a case such as Jones v. Beame17 suggests 
that anti-cruelty statutes do not vest animals with standing to sue. 
In that case, a primary issue was whether standing should be 
granted to various individuals and animal welfare organizations 
who, on behalf of zoo animals, sought an injunction against opera-
tion of the Central Park and Prospect Park Zoos and the compulsory 
transfer of the animals to the Bronx Zoo. The plaintiffs alleged that 
poor environmental conditions in the zoos resulted in emotional 
damage and poor health to the animals. 18 The plaintiffs proceeded, 
inter alia, under anti-cruelty statutes. IS The defendant, the City of 
New York, challenged the plaintiffs standing to sue and also argued 
that the statutes, being criminal in nature, did not provide a civil 
remedy. The lower court held that enforcement of the statutes by 
civil action was implicit in the legislative mandate and intent, even 
though the relevant sections contained only criminal sanctions and 
enforcement procedures. The court also held that the plaintiffs had 
standing to bring the suit, observing that plaintiffs' allegations, if 
true, established cruelty to the animals in violation of the provisions 
of the statute. Dismissal of the action for lack of standing, the court 
noted, would have erected an impenetrable barrier to judicial scru-
tiny of the lawfulness of the City's maintenance of its zoos. As the 
court stated, "This case presents issues of importance and signifi-
cance to our society. And justice required that judicial inquiry and 
resolutions of the grave questions not be thwarted."20 
" E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 599c (West 1970). 
17 86 Misc. 2d 832,382 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (1976) (rev'd. 56 App. Div. 2d 778,392 N.Y.S.2d 444 
(1977». 
1M [d. at 838-39,382 N.Y.S.2d 1009-10. 
" N.Y. AGRIc. & MKTS. LAw §§ 353, 356, 357 (McKinney 1965). 
,. Jones v. Bearne, 86 Misc. 2d 832, 837, 382 N.Y.S.2d 1004, 1009 (1976) (rev 'd. 56 App. 
Div. 2d 778, 392 N.Y.S.2d 444 (1977». 
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By refusing to dismiss the suit and by emphasizing the allegations 
of cruelty to the animals in light of the statutory prohibition, the 
lower court, in effect, ruled that the animals were within the "zone 
of interests" protected by the statute. Had not this decision been 
reversed on appeal, it would have established a truly significant 
precedent in the area of animal law. However, the New York Appel-
late Division reversed the lower court decision, holding that plain-
tiffs did not have standing to bring suit for a declaratory judgment 
against the City for improper maintenance of a public facility.21 The 
court sl,lmmarily stated that citizens could not challenge the man-
agement of a public enterprise. The substantive issues raised were 
not addressed or considered and the alleged violation of the anti-
cruelty laws and the plight of the zoo animals thus went unheeded 
in court. 
If substantive claims regarding treatment of animals never reach 
adjudication because plaintiffs lack standing, the protection offered 
by anti-cruelty statutes is greatly diminished. Since standing de-
pends largely on the "zone of interests" protected by the statutes, 
further scrutiny of anti-cruelty statutes may reveal deficiencies 
which ultimately prevent animals from having standing to assert 
rights under the statutes. Under Stone's criteria, the law must focus 
on injury to the animal itself. Unless statutes have such a focus, 
animals have no rights under the statutes. 
III. SUBSTANTIVE LAWS 
Anti-cruelty statutes have been enacted in every state. At first 
glance they appear to promote humane treatment of animals as a 
value in itself, apart from rights of ownership in the animal. How-
ever, almost all of the anti-cruelty statutes either except certain 
classes of owners or activities from the statutory mandate or require 
an exacting standard of degree, knowledge, or intent before the 
statute applies.22 Additionally, courts have construed a requirement 
of such standards where they are not explicitly mentioned in the 
statute.23 Such statutory language and construction indicates that 
it is not the intrinsic value of rights of the animal which motivates 
and guides our courts and legislatures. Instead, the property interest 
in the animal and the moral value that society attaches to certain 
types of human behavior are controlling. 
21 Jones v. Bearne, 56 App. Div. 2d 778, 392 N.Y.S.2d 444 (1977). 
22 See text at notes 25-52, infra. 
23 See text at note 53, infra. 
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Some states have followed the common law notion of property 
rights in animals by restricting protection only to "domestic" or 
"owned" animals. 24 Where classes of animals are distinguished by 
virtue of ownership, the property rights of human beings are the 
protected interests and the rights of animals are at best secondary. 
Certain classes of animals are either exempted or not included in 
many statutes because their inclusion would conflict with some 
human interest. That interest may be economic, the desire to ad-
vance knowledge, or simply an amusement. Nowhere are such dis-
tinctions and exemptions more unfortunately demonstrated than 
with respect to experimental animals. In a number of states, experi-
mental animals in scientific institutions are specifically exempted 
from protection under the anti-cruelty statutes.25 Even where this 
specific exemption is not written into the law, researchers seem to 
enjoy limitless discretion in terms of setting objectives for research 
and conducting experiments. 
Some federal regulation of laboratory animals is provided by the 
Animal Welfare Act of 1970.28 The original statute, the Federal Lab-
oratory Animal Welfare Act, 'EI was written with the stated purpose 
of protecting the owners of dogs and cats from theft of their pets for 
use in research facilities. 28 A secondary purpose was to insure that 
"certain animals intended for use in research facilities are provided 
humane care and treatment. . . . "29 It was not until the law was 
amended for the second time in 1976 that the purpose of providing 
humane care and treatment for labratory animals was given priority 
in the law's statement policy.30 
The Animal Welfare Act 31 provides for the registration of research 
facilities and for the marking and identification of animals. It sets 
standards for the housing, transportation, and handling of animals 
intended for use in research as well as for animals intended for 
exhibition or sold as pets. The law directs the Secretary of Agricul-
ture to "promulgate humane standards" including minimum re-
quirements with respect to handling, housing, feeding, watering, 
" E.g., NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 28-550-28-564 (1975). 
" E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 599c (West 1970). 
'" Animal Welfare Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-579, 84 Stat. 1560 (1970), as amended by 
Animal Welfare Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-279, 90 Stat. 417 (1976) (current 
version of Act at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-56 (1976)). 
27 Act of August 24, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-544, 80 Stat. 350 (1966) (amended by the Animal 
Welfare Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-579, 84 Stat. 1560 (1970)) . 
.. Pub. L. No. 89-544 § 1, 80 Stat. 350 § 1. 
.. Id. 
"" Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2131 (1976). 
" 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2156 (1976). 
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sanitation and ventilation.32 However, the Animal Welfare Act spe-
cifically excludes the application of humane standards to the actual 
experiments. As the Act states, "Nothing in this chapter shall be 
construed as authorizing the Secretary to promulgate rules, regula-
tions, or orders with regard to design, outlines, guidelines, or per-
formance of actual research or experimentation by a research facil-
ity as determined by such research facility."33 
In other words, so far as actual experimentation is concerned, 
the researcher is not restricted at all by the statute. The Act also 
provides for the "appropriate use" of anesthetic drugs in conformity 
with the opinion of the attending veterinarian.34 However, if the 
researcher determines that the objectives of the research project 
preclude the use of anesthetizing drugs, the experiment may pro-
ceed accordingly. "No attempt is made," one critic of the law points 
out, "to assess whether these 'objectives' are sufficiently important 
to justify the infliction of pain."35 The assumption is that virtually 
any experiment is reasonable in relation to animal suffering. The 
researcher apparently has unlimited discretion in determining the 
value of the experiment, the necessity of inflicting pain on animals, 
and the advisability of using anesthetizing drugs. 
Although periodically public furor is aroused when particular ex-
periments, usually those involving cats or dogs, come to the public's 
attention, the nature and purpose of most of the estimated millions 
of animal experiments conducted in the United States every year 
are not common knowledge. They are generally considered to be 
justified on the basis of their contribution to medical science. Yet 
Peter Singer, a philosopher who examines this subject extensively 
in his book, Animal Liberation, concludes that most of the experi-
ments are "trivial and obvious,"38 motivated by a "general goalless 
curiosity."37 Singer believes that much of the research in the long 
run "turns out to have been quite pointless. "38 He postulates that if 
those experiments "serving no direct and urgent purpose" were to 
stop immediately, enormous numbers of animals would be spared 
pain, deprivation, and death.3' Gerald Carson, in his book Man, 
Beast, and Gods, writes: 
32 Id. at § 2143(a). 
33 Id. 
31 Id. 
35 P. SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION 74 (1975). 
,. Id. at 42. 
37 Id. at 54. 
311 Id. 
3' Id. at 34. 
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Today painful procedures are carried out routinely in fields of inquiry 
that have nothing to do with the conquest of disease. Many of them 
raise, or should raise, questions of conscience. Permanent-wave lotions 
are injected into the eyes of rabbits held rigid in stocks, and at the Ohio 
State University, as this is written, rabbits are wearing contact lenses 
in search for softer materials, although softness can be measured me-
chanically in other ways than by punishing rabbits. The Ford Motor 
Company used baboons, strapped in sleds, as high-speed crash victims, 
because for precise data on impact and stress there is, apparently, noth-
ing like a baboon. The Air Force has conducted experiments on pregnant 
monkeys in crash tests. Results are encouraging, but as is so often the 
case, the findings are only "preliminary" and will have to be repeated 
over and over. How many pregnant women are expected to fly military 
aircraft has not yet been disclosed.40 
If, as Carson and Singer suggest, the most trivial experimentation 
is justified on the basis of satisfying mere intellectual curiosity, 
serious doubts are raised about the consideration of injury to the 
animal as an underlying motivation of our substantive laws. As we 
have seen, experimental animals as a class are virtually excluded 
from the protection of the anti-cruelty laws, and the Animal Welfare 
Act41 which applies to such animals, gives researchers almost limit-
less discretion in determining whether the nature and purpose of the 
experiments warrant animal suffering. 
Descriptions from the journals of experimental research, cited by 
Singer in Animal Liberation, 42 support the conclusion that the inad-
equate protection given to animals in this area is based on selfish 
human interests, and that the rationalization of "necessity" has 
little basis in fact.43 The vivid descriptions contained in these scitm-
'" G. CARSON, MEN, BEASTS, AND GODS 197 (1972). 
" 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131·2156 (1976). 
" P. SINGER, supra, note 35. 
'" The citations in this note list the journal containing the information used by Singer, 
followed by the page reference to Animal Liberation. 
Some of the most trivial experimentation is performed in the field of psychology. A typical 
kind of experiment is directed toward finding out how animals react to different kinds of 
punishment, usually varying degrees of pain. Electric shock is a familiar means of administer-
ing punishment, probably because the intensity of the shock, as well as its duration, can be 
regulated and measured. In one experiment, shock was administered to dogs' feet through a 
grid floor; not surprisingly, the dogs reacted by jumping over a barrier to escape the shock. 
The passage over the barrier was later blocked with a piece of plate glass, the dogs in 
attempting to jump smashed their heads against the glass. As reported by Singer, the experi-
menters described themselves as "impressed" by the result that the dogs eventually ceased 
to resist the shock, and conclude that a combination of foot shock and the plate glass barrier 
was effective in eliminating jumping by dogs. 48 J. ABNORMAL & Soc. PSYCH. 291 (1953), P. 
SINGER at 38. In another experiment, researchers administered shocks to dogs in harnesses 
from which they had no means of escape, and afterwards placed these dogs in a shuttlebox 
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tific journals are a shocking reminder that in our society animals do 
not possess the right to be free from inflicted pain and suffering so 
long as the end or objective of the experimental activity is arguably 
reasonable. 
Not only is experimentation often trivial and unnecessary but, 
even in the cases of substantial justifiable research, animal welfare 
is often subservient to human economic interest. Beyond the experi-
mental context, trapping by the leg-hold steel trap is still permitted 
even though these traps cause acute and prolonged suffering which 
would, to most objective observers, constitute cruelty. More hu-
mane traps have been successfully opposed by those who profit from 
trapping. Factory farm animals are raised in miserable conditions, 
but they are outside the protection of the law. The Animal Welfare 
where up to "50 seconds of severe, pulsating shock on each trial" was administered. This 
experiment produced the conclusion that a dog previously exposed to inescapable shock 
eventually "seems to 'give up' and passively 'accept' the shock." 73 J. ABNORMAL PSYCH. 256 
(1968), P. SINGER at 39. Giving chickens inescapable shock is more distressing than escapable 
shock. 78 J. COMPo & PHYSIOLOGICAL PSYCH. 22 (1972), P. SINGER at 40. 
Researchers are also interested in the results of various kinds of deprivation, even where 
the results seem very obvious. Often, such deprivation involves food or water. In one such 
experiment, pigeons were starved to 70 percent of their normal weight so that researchers 
might conclude that "prolonged periods of food deprivation are typically followed by an 
increased responsiveness to food .... " 76 J. COMPo & PHYSIOLOGICAL PSYCH. 468 (1971), P. 
SINGER at 42. Experimenters caused rats to die from thirst and starvation and reported that 
"under conditions of fatal thirst and starvation young rats are much more active than normal 
adult rats given food and water." 78 J. COMPo & PHYSIOLOGICAL PSYCH. 202 (1972), P. SINGER 
at 42. Producing psychological deprivation apparently requires more ingenuity: a well-known 
series of experiments conducted at the Primate Research Center in Madison, Wisconsin, 
involved the removal of baby monkeys from their natural mothers and, in an attempt to 
induce psychopathological behavior, substitute cloth monkeys were provided which could 
"become monsters" in a variety of ways. First, these substitute "mothers" would "eject high-
pressure compressed air" which would "blow the animal's skin practically off its body;" 
another model would "rock so violently that the baby's head and teeth would rattle;" a third 
had a wire frame which could spring forward and eject the infant from its surface; and finally, 
the researchers devised a "porcupine mother" which would "eject sharp brass spikes over all 
of the ventral surface of its body." In all these instances, the infants continued to cling to 
the surrogate mothers, or where ejected from the surface, would return to cling to the surro-
gate. These resultS'the experimenters themselves found not too surprising, since as Singer 
notes, "the only recourse of an injured child is to cling to its mother." 33 ENG. & SCI. 8 (1970), 
P. SINGER at 43-45. 
Another major area of experimentation involves the testing of new substances before they. 
are released. These experiments, according to Singer, rarely involve potentially life-saving 
drugs (as commonly supposed), but rather new cosmetics, non-essential food additives (such " 
as colorings) and industrial and household goods. P. SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION, 49-51 
(1975). The jlJ~jfkationfor inflicting.pailLon..these..anima1s.-m.ay .. be-aaidro --be---commercial 
r~an scientific. Many of these tesfsinvolvt! animals' eyes to determine toxicity, irri-
tation,IUiifaii"ii1ilgi!. In a typical experiment, the substance is applied to rabbits' eyes, 
sometimes repeatedly over a period of several days. The damage is measured according to 
the "size of the area injured, the degree of swelling and redness, and other types of injury." 
[d. at 50-51. 
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Act, H which provides minimal space requirements for caged ani-
mals, as well as standards in housing, ventilation, feeding, and sani-
tation, specifically excludes "farm animals" from its designation of 
"animals. "45 According to Singer, factory farm animals are confined 
in stalls or cages with barely room to turn around for their entire 
existences.46 In addition to the physical discomforts of crowding and 
confinement, most units provide slatted floors for ease in mainte-
nance, which damage the feet and legs of such animals as pigs.47 In 
the case of hens, wire floors damage the birds' feet and sometimes 
result in their toenails becoming permanently entangled in the 
wire.48 Such conditions are apparently justified by economic conven-
ience, with little or no consideration of the animal's suffering. 
Even where statutes do not specifically exclude certain kinds or 
classes of animals, courts may create exemptions by statutory inter-
pretation. In State ex. rei Miller v. Claiborne,49 for example, the 
court refused to enjoin the practice of cockfighting on the basis of 
the Kansas anti-cruelty statute. The statute provided: 
(1) Cruelty to animals is: 
(a) Subjecting any animal to cruel mistreatment; or 
(b) Having custody of any animal and subjecting such animal to 
cruel neglect. 50 
Mter a brief review of the history of the sport of cockfighting, the 
court concluded that gamecocks were not animals, therefore, they 
did not come within the prohibitions of the anti-cruelty statute. 
Such laws, the court noted, "have traditionally been directed to-
ward protection of the four-footed animal, especially beasts of the 
field and beasts of burden. "51 
The court's comment reflects old common law notions which 
equate animal protection with the owner's propriety interest. More-
over, the court's action demonstrates that even the human interest 
in amusement may override a seemingly explicit statute promoting 
animal welfare. 
In addition to exemptions (either explicit or arising from judicial 
interpretation) for certain classes of animals or certain behavior 
" 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2156 (1976). 
" [d. at § 2132(g). 
II See generally P. SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION chapter 3 (1975). 
" [d. at 122 . 
.. [d. at 11I. 
.. 211 Kan. 264, 505 P.2d 732 (1973) . 
.. KAN. STAT. § 21-4310 (1974). 
"' 211 Kan. at 268, 505 P.2d at 735. 
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with respect to animals, the anti-cruelty laws usually contain lan-
guage which qualifies the statutory proscriptions. According to most 
statutes, not every act which results in pain or suffering to an ani-
mal constitutes cruelty. The ultimate standard seems to be the 
moral culpability of the actor rather than the right of the animal 
not to be subjected to pain. Malevolent purpose appears to be an 
essential requirement for commission of a crime under the anti-
cruelty laws. Most crimes require a criminal or guilty intent, how-
ever, legislatures and courts seem to require more than the normal 
criminal intent in the area of animal cruelty. Often a deliberate and 
purposeful decision to cause the suffering itself is required to con-
stitute cruelty Y This requirement frequently results in a tooth-
less statute, under which conviction is extremely difficult. 
Even where a requirement of willfulness, malice, or intent is not 
written into the statute, the courts may construe the law with such 
a requirement. For example, in People v. O'Rourke53 New York 
City's Criminal Court considered proof of a hansom cab driver's 
mental culpability in driving a limping horse essential to the finding 
that the driver had violated the Argiculture and Markets Law.54 The 
52 Where the statutes stipulate that "beating" an animal is a prohibited act, the word 
"beating" is almost invariably qualified by the adverb "cruelly" which implies malice. Tor-
menting or torturing an animaf is usually prohibited without qualifying words, but these 
terms already indicate maliciousness. Moreover, a number of states explicitly require that 
cruel treatment be willful. "Intentionally" or "willfully" means something more than acting 
with awareness. For example, Delaware defines cruelty as "intentionally or recklessly" sub-
jecting an animal to "cruel mistreatment," DEL. CODE tit. 11, § 1325 (1974); intentionally, in 
this context, seems to mean that a deliberate and purposeful decision to cause suffering is 
required to constitute cruelty. Kentucky law contains the phrase, "intentionally or wantonly" 
before the prohibition against causing an animal "cruel or injurious mistreatment" by such 
acts as beating, torturing, tormenting, mutilating, abandoning, or neglecting an animal or 
causing it to fight. Ky. REV. STAT. § 525.130 (1975). Louisiana requires behavior to be 
"intentional or criminally negligent" to violate the statute. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:102 
(West 1974). Missouri and Oklahoma law add the qualification that actions be willful or 
malicious. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 563.670 (Vernon Supp. 1977); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 1685 
(West 1951). 
Other qualifications found in the language of anti-cruelty statutes include "cruelly, unnec-
essarily, or needlessly." (West Virginia; W. VA. CODE § 61-8-19 (1977); but see Anderson v. 
George, __ W. Va. __ , 233 S.E.2d 407 (1977) (willfulness is an element of some, but not 
all, of the offenses listed in § 61-8-19». The term "unnecessarily" is used in Alaska, ALASKA 
STAT. § 11.40.490 (1970) (domestic animals); but see id. at § 11.40.480 (general definition), 
and "maliciously" is used in Arizona and California. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-951 (1956); CAL. 
PENAL CODE § 597 (West Supp. 1977). Wisconsin defines "cruelty" as "causing unnecessary 
and excessive pain or suffering or unjustifiable injury or death." WIS. STAT. § 948.01 (1975). 
A number of other states require that the pain or suffering be "unjustifiable." GA. CODE 
§ 26-2801 (1975); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:102 (West 1974); FLA. STAT. § 828.02 (1977) 
("unnecessary or unjustifiable"). 
" 8& Misc. 2d 175, 369 N.Y.S.2d 335 (1975) . 
.. The applicable-pw\dsions of the N~ York Agriculture and Markets Law provide: 
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evidence in the record was "sufficient to support the conclusion that 
the horse was not given proper medical attention to alleviate the 
pain."55 However, the court stated, the "mere act of driving a sick, 
sore, lame or disabled horse is not, per se, torture intended to be 
prevented by the statute. "58 The court added: 
In order to convict a defendant under section 353 of the Agriculture and 
Markets Law, the defendant must have a culpable state of mind. Al-
though the statute does not contain words requiring culpability, unless 
there is clear legislative intent to impose strict liability, a criminal stat-
ute should be construed as requiring mental culpabilityY 
Under such a standard, problems of proof arise. Where the abu-
sive act itself is not actionable, human corroboration may be neces-
sary in order to prove the requisite degree of criminal intent. The 
fact that the driver continued to work the limping horse in O'Rourke 
was apparently insufficient in and of itself to show that the driver 
had a culpable state of mind. This was true even though limping is 
a physical manisfestation of pain and the driver should have known 
that the horse was injured. The requirement of mental culpability 
was ultimately satisfied in O'Rourke because of evidence that an 
American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals inspector 
had warned the defendant that the limping horse was in no condi-
tion to be worked. On the following day, the horse, still limping, was 
driven again. The case is offered to question whether the court's 
requirement that the defendant have a "culpable state of mind" is 
a requirement which effectively precludes conviction except in the 
most extreme or unusual circumstances. It is urged that a more 
appropriate standard in a custodial relationship between an animal 
and a human being is one which would impose sanctions if the actor 
knew or should have known the consequences of his act or neglect. 
The extent to which proof of culpability may legally sanction 
obvious cruelty to animals is demonstrated by State v. Fowler. 58 In 
this case, a witness testified that she had observed the defendant 
A person who overdrives, overloads, tortures or cruelly beats or unjustifiably injures, 
maims, mutilates or kills any animal . . . or causes, procures or permits any animal to 
be overdriven, overloaded, tortured, cruelly beaten, or unjustifiably injured, maimed, 
mutilated or killed. . . is guilty of a misdemeanor. . . . 
N.Y. AGRle. & MKTs. LAW § 353 (McKinney 1965). "Torture" or cruelty is defined as: 
"[elvery act, omission, or neglect, whereby unjustifiable physical pain, suffering or death is 
caused or permitted." N.Y. AGRIc. & MKTS. LAw § 350 (McKinney 1965). 
" People v. O'Rourke, 83 Misc.2d 175, 180, 369 N.Y.S.2d 335,341 (1975). 
" [d. at 179, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 340. 
" [d. 
" 22 N.C. App. 144, 205 S.E.2d 749 (1974). 
1978] LEGAL DEFINITIONS 159 
beating his dog, then tying it up. She also stated that the defendant 
and his wife submerged the dog's head in a hole filled with water, 
and that the process was repeated for about 15 or 20 minutes, caus-
ing the dog to gag and choke. The witness testified that the defen-
dant and his wife then untied the dog, hit it and kicked it, and tied 
it to a pole near the water-filled hole. 
The defendant was charged with violating the North Carolina 
anti-cruelty statute which requires "willful" mistreatment of an 
animal. The court stated, "Willful means more than intentional. It 
means without just cause, excuse, or justification. "59 According to 
evidence presented by the defendant, he and his wife were profes-
sional dog trainers, and their treatment of the dog was motivated 
by their desire to stop the dog from a habit of digging holes in the 
yard. The defendant argued that "a beating inflicted for corrective 
or disciplinary purposes without an evil motive is not a crime, even 
if painful and even if excessive. "80 The court agreed. Citing an early 
New Hampshire case,81 the court noted that "punishment adminis-
tered to an animal in an honest and good faith effort to train it is 
not without justification and not willful."82 Therefore, the court 
ordered the lower court's verdict of guilty set aside and ordered a 
new trial with instructions to be given to the jury that if it found 
that the defendant inflicted the punishment in a good faith effort 
to train the dog, it should return a verdict of not guilty.83 The court 
equated criminal intent with evil intent, demonstrating that it is the 
actor's moral sense that is at issue. Indeed, as the court observed, 
the "same act committed against the dog for the purpose of tortur-
ing it would be within the purview of the statute."84 
Aside from such a criminal intent requirement making conviction 
virtually impossible except in the most unusual circumstances, it 
also reflects the notion that injury to the animal is not the focus of 
anti-cruelty legislation. The indication in Fowler that "reasonable" 
or "justifiable" injury to animals is permissible suggests that the 
moral culpability which society attaches to certain human behavior, 
rather than an ethical predisposition against animal suffering, is 
controlling.85 
•• [d. at 147, 205 S.E.2d at 751. 
.. [d. at 146, 205 S.E.2d at 751. 
.. State v. Avery, 44 N.H. 392 (1862). 
12 State v. Fowler, 22 N.C. App. 144, 147, 205 S.E.2d 749, 751 (1974). 
" [d . 
.. [d . 
.. The case points out a further limitation on protection offered by anti-cruelty statutes. 
In jurisdictions which only protect domestic or "owned" animals, if the reasoning in State v. 
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Inconsistencies in the laws themselves with respect to classes of 
animals, standards of reasonableness and necessity, and require-
ments for culpability, preserve and support the attitude that ani-
mals exist for the use and benefit of human beings. One cannot deny 
that anti-cruelty statutes are important, both in practical terms and 
because they express generally the proposition that torturing ani-
mals is morally repugnant. At present "cruelty" is rather narrowly 
defined, and the laws are designed to discourage sadistic behavior 
and conserve the public morals rather than confer upon animals the 
inherent right not to be hurt. The conclusion compels a finding that 
animals are not within the "zone of interests" protected by the law, 
and thus do not possess standing to institute legal action. Conse-
quently, the first of Stone's three criteria for possessing legal rights 
is not met. Without such rights, the gaps in our legal framework of 
animal protection will continue to exist. 
IV. REMEDY 
According to Stone's third criterion, an animal cannot be said to 
be a "holder of legal rights" unless the relief for infringement of such 
rights benefits the animal. The typical punishment for violating the 
anti-cruelty laws is a fine, which may vary from $588 to $1000,87 but 
which usually seems to be within the $100 to $200 range.8S Such fines 
cannot be said to constitute relief in recognition of injury to the 
animal nor is the relief granted for the animal's benefit. Rather, 
such a remedy for cruelty to animals is a penalty imposed by the 
state for violation of its mandates. The remedy is thus consistent 
with the underlying purpose of the substantive laws, which is to 
discourage sadistic behavior and establish a public standard of mo-
rality. 
In addition to criminal sanctions such as fines, civil actions with 
liberalized standing requirements should be possible. Interested cit-
izens or animal protection organizations should be able to bring 
such civil suits on behalf of abused animals. Money damages based 
on harm to the animal could be awarded to the representative plain-
tiff in place of a fine paid to the state. Such money damages not 
Fowler, supra, note 50, controls (essentially allowing any act by the owners except reasonless 
cruelty), all animals are subject to abuse. The only effective statutory proscription applies 
solely to acts by non-owners against domestic animals. 
II E.g., NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-551 (1975). 
17 E.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 59 (as amended 1975) . 
.. E.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:102 (West 1974). An appropriate class of animals for such 
relief would be, for example, the class of research animals. 
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applied directly toward the care and maintenance of the injured 
animal could be devoted to projects benefiting animals as a class. 
Such a plan would constitute relief on behalf of and in recognition 
of the harm to the animal. 
Another kind of remedy that would directly benefit the animal is 
specific relief, such as injunction. Such relief is particularly appro-
priate where the cruelty is of an ongoing nature or where the injury 
cannot be remedied by money damages directed at one animal or a 
class of animals. This kind of relief was unsuccessfully sought by the 
plaintiffs in Jones v. Beame89 in their suit to enjoin operation of the 
New York City zoos on grounds of cruelty. In a case such as Jones, 
specific relief, such as transfer of the animals, would have effectively 
prevented further injury and continued suffering.7o 
V. CONCLUSION: A POLICY ARGUMENT-ToWARD NEW LEGAL 
STANDARDS 
Under present law animals do not possess legal rights. The limita-
tions of anti-cruelty statutes and the narrow construction of such 
laws in the courts compel the conclusion that the law is not based 
on injury to the animal. Animals are merely the indirect beneficiar-
ies of minimal protection from harm because society wishes to curb 
malicious and cruel behavior. Anything that is reasonable, that is, 
appropriate to human interests, is apparently permissible, without 
regard for the actual pain or injury to the animal. 
In order to confer rights upon animals, a fundamental shift in 
attitude is required with respect to the relationship of human beings 
to the rest of the natural world. Basically, our vision of the natural . 
world is egocentric and utiliterian: the world exists for the use and 
benefit of "us." The primary justification for preserving the natural 
environment, for example, even among staunch environmentalists, 
is its present and continuing value to us. Indeed, the phrase 
"natural resources" incorporates the notion of something which is 
valued primarily for its use and benefit to human beings, whether 
that benefit be economic or aesthetic.71 
II See note 17 and text at note 17, supra. 
70 While money awards may have been used to improve the conditions in the zoo, any 
improvements would not have been made quickly enough to afford adequate relief to the 
animals. 
71 The majority opinion in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), demonstrates the 
legal implications of defining our relationship with the natural world in such a manner. The 
environmental group was denied standing to sue because it failed to allege "use" of the area 
which it sought to protect. 
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An argument that animals have the right not to be mistreated 
may be based upon the same moral considerations that give human 
beings certain fundamental rights. The criterion for our recognition 
of certain rights is not merely a utilitarian one. For example, we do 
not tolerate slavery, although as oppressed persons, slaves are not 
in a position to challenge those who are holders of rights. According 
to a utilitarian perspective, it would be more beneficial, at least 
economically, to keep slaves in the fields. But our society considers 
the exploitation of certain groups of people by others to be morally 
reprehensible, and the law recognizes this fundamental injustice. 
However, animals are not humans. The correlation between op-
I, pressed persons and animals strikes many as ridiculous. As Profes-\ sor Stone points out, whenever there is a movement to confer rights 
\. on some new "entity," the proposal seems absurd.72 "This is partly 
because," Stone notes, "until the rightless thing receives its rights, 
we cannot see it as anything but a thing for the use of 'us' -those 
who are holding rights at the time."73 Children were not always 
"persons" under the law, Stone points out, nor were blacks, women, 
slaves, or aliens.74 There is, as Stone suggests, something of a 
"seamless web involved" in proposing rights for entities which have 
no rights: "[T]here will be resistance to giving the thing 'rights' 
until it can be seen and valued for itself; yet, it is hard to see it and 
value it for itself until we can bring ourselves to give it 
'rights' -which is almost inevitably going to sound inconceivable to 
a large group of people."75 
One basis for distinguishing between the rights of humans and 
animals is intelligence. If we followed this argument to its logical 
extreme, certain "necessary" cruelty to infants or mentally defec-
tive adults would be permissible. But in fact, we recognize that 
human beings possess certain fundamental rights by virtue of their 
humanity, regardless of their intellectual capacity or usefulness to 
society. Peter Singer's argument for recognizing certain animal 
rights follows similar reasoning: 
[T]here can be no reason-except the selfish desire to preserve the 
privileges of the exploiting group-for refusing to extend the basic prin-
ciple of equality of consideration to members of other species. 
7. See, C. STONE, supra note I, at 8. 
n [d. at 8. 
" [d. at 4. 
7. [d. at 9. 
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[A]ttitudes to members of other species are a form of prejudice no less 
objectionable than prejudice about a person's race or sex.78 
Singer makes an important distinction between extending equal or 
identical treatment to other groups or species and equal 
consideration according to needs, interests, or capacities.77 The dif-
ferences between humans and animals would obviously give rise to 
different treatment and different rights, just as the differences be-
tween children and adults may give rise to different kinds of rights. 
Thus, it would be ridiculous to give infants the right to vote or dogs 
the right to free speech, since these rights would be meaningless in 
terms of capacity to utilize the rights. 
Humans and animals share the capacity to suffer. Thus, animals 
should share with humans the right to be free from cruel abuse. The 
philosopher Jeremy Bentham made the following argument nearly 
two hundred years ago: 
The day may come when the rest of the animal creation may acquire 
those rights which never could have been withholden from them but by 
the hand of tyranny. The French have already discovered that the black-
ness of the skin is no reason why a human being should be abandoned 
without redress to the caprice of a tormentor. It may come one day to 
be recognized, that the number of the legs ... [is an] equally insuffi-
cient reason for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. What else 
is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason, 
or, perhaps, the faculty of discourse? But a full-grown horse or dog is 
beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more conversable ani-
mal, than an infant of a day, or a week, or even a month, old. But 
suppose the case were otherwise, what would it avail? The question is 
not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?7K 
The appropriate standard, then, is not intelligence, but conscious-
ness. It is well recognized that animals possess a capacity to feel 
pain that is not demonstrably different from that of human beings. 
Indeed, one justification for research that involves animal responses 
to pain is that such responses have application to human pain. 
Thus, the law should reflect at least two fundamental principles 
in defining cruelty to animals: first, that natural entities have in-
trinsic value simply by virtue of their existence, and this intrinsic 
value gives rise to certain rights; and second, that the capacity tor 
suffer is the appropriate consideration in determining that animals 
" P. SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION, xi (1975). 
77 Id., chapter 1. 
" J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 311, n.l 
(1789) (Hafner ed.). 
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have basic rights in terms of that capacity.79 
The idea that animals should possess legal rights seems radical 
today. However, civil rights movements have historically been 
viewed with analogous political skepticism. Law responds to the 
social conscience; changing attitudes have been reflected in legisla-
tion, court opinions, and legal scholarship. As forward-looking legis-
lation and judicial opinions emerge in response to society's changing 
ethics, legal recognition of certain rights will precede social change. 
Legal changes have not only influenced behavior, but have affected 
attitudes underlying such behavior. Thus, it is important that law, ! 
in all its aspects, take an active role in advancing the rights of 
rightless beings, such as animals. 
71 The result of applying these principles to the substantive laws would be anti-cruelty 
statutes which focus on the harm to the animal-first, because the animal is a thing of value 
in itself and second, because pain is impermissible whether or not such pain is the result of 
evil intent. Such qualifiers as "maliciously," "wantonly," "reasonably," or "necessarily" 
would be eliminated; these qualifiers have the effect of depicting the quality of the act in 
terms of the human actor, rather than in terms of pain to the animal. Thus, for example, 
beating an animal would be presumptive of cruelty, but since no rights are absolute, justifica-
tions such as self-defense, mental distress, and so on would be available as they are in crimes 
against human beings. 
